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Abstract
This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a
simple game as the intersection (union) of weighted majority games, as
well as, the dimension or the codimension. We also present some exam-
ples with linear dimension and exponential codimension with respect
to the number of players.
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1
1 Introduction and preliminaries
We consider the so-called simple games and the computational complexity
of representing them as unions or intersections of weighted majority games.
Simple games and its dimension, as well as, weighted majority games, were
defined by Taylor and Zwicker [12]. Later, Freixas and Marciniak [3] intro-
duced a new concept, the codimension of simple games.
A simple game is a tuple Γ = (N,W), where N is a finite set of players
and W ⊆ P(N) is a monotonic family of subsets of N . Furthermore, its
dual Γ∗ = (N,W∗) is the game such that W∗ = {S ⊆ N : N \ S 6∈ W}. Γ
is said to be self-dual if Γ = Γ∗. Note that (Γ∗)∗ = Γ. Given two simple
games Γ1 = (N1,W1) and Γ2 = (N2,W2), they are equivalent if N1 = N2
and W1 = W2. The subsets of N are called coalitions, the set N is the
grand coalition and each X ∈ W is a winning coalition. The complement
of the family of winning coalitions is the family of losing coalitions L, i.e.,
L = P(N) \ W. Any of those set families determine uniquely the game Γ
and constitute one of the usual forms of representation for simple games [12],
although the size of the representation is not, in general, polynomial in the
number of players [10].
A simple game Γ is a weighted majority game (WMG) if it admits a
representation by means of n + 1 nonnegative real numbers [q;w1, . . . , wn]
such that S ∈ W ⇐⇒ w(S) ≥ q where, for each coalition S ⊆ N , w(S) =∑
i∈S wi. The number q is called the quota and wi the weight of the player
i. It is well known that any WMG admits a representation with integer
numbers.
The dimension of a simple game Γ is the least k such that there exists
WMGs Γ1, . . . ,Γk such that Γ = Γ1 ∩ . . . ∩ Γk. On the other hand, the
codimension of a simple game Γ is the least k such that there exists WMGs
Γ1, . . . ,Γk such that Γ = Γ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Γk.
Many theoretical results and examples about dimension and codimen-
sion [11, 8, 3, 7, 5, 12, 6] have been constantly appearing during the last
years, as well as, computational complexity results [9, 4, 1]. We present
some results that will be used in Section 2.
Lemma 1. The dimension of a simple game v is bounded above by
∣∣∣LM ∣∣∣
and the co-dimension is bounded above by |Wm|.
Lemma 2. Let Γ be a simple game. Γ is the intersection of t weighted
games if and only if Γ∗ is the union of t weighted games. Furthermore a
representation, as union (intersection), of Γ∗ can be obtained from a rep-
resentation, as intersection (union), of Γ in polynomial time. Moreover,
dim(Γ)=codim(Γ∗), and if Γ is self-dual then dim(Γ) = codim(Γ).
Note that the converse statement of the last sentence is not true in
general as there are weighted games which are not self-dual.
2
2 Computational complexity of related problems
First, we present a simple game with 2n players, dimension n and codimen-
sion 2n−1. Other examples of simple games with 2n players and dimension
2n−1 can be found in [12, 11].
Example 1. Given a positive integer n, Freixas and Marcinicak (Theorem
2 of [3]) define a simple game with 2n players and dimension n. Let Γ =
(N,W) be a simple game defined by N = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} and S ∈ W iff
S ∩ {2i− 1, 2i} 6= ∅, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then Γ has dimension n,
Γ = [1; 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, 0]∩[1; 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, 0]∩. . .∩[1; 0, 0, . . . , 0, 0, 1, 1]
As S is a winning coalition in Γ∗ iff N \ S is a losing coalition in Γ, Γ∗ =
(N,W∗1 ∪ . . .∪W∗n), where W∗i = {S ⊆ N : {2i−1, 2i} ⊆ S}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
As Γ∗ is a composition of n unanimity games, Γ∗ has dimension 2n−1 [5]
and Γ has codimension 2n−1 (by Lemma 2).
Proposition 1. Given a simple game Γ as union (intersection) of weighted
games, computing a representation of Γ as intersection (union) of weighted
games requires exponential time.
The complexity of several problems about representations of simple games
as intersections of WMGs were analyzed in [1]. We provide here a new reduc-
tion from the NP-hard Subset Sum Problem (SSP). Our reduction differs in
the fact that for the associated game we know both the dimension and the
codimension. Recall that in the SSP on input a finite set A = {a1, . . . , an}
of positive integers and a positive integer b we want to know whether there
is a subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑ai∈A′ ai = b.
Let I = (b; a1, a2, . . . , an) be an instance of the SSP, d > 1, and let
Γ(I, d) be the game defined on n + d players by the intersection of the d
WMGs:
[3b + 1; 3a1, . . . , 3an, 1, 1, 0,
2(d−1). . . , 0], [3b + 1; 3a1, . . . , 3an, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 2(d−2). . . , 0],
. . . , [3b + 1; 3a1, . . . , 3an, 0,
2(d−1). . . , 0, 1, 1].
Lemma 3. Let d > 1. When I is a yes instance of SSP then dim(Γ(I, d)) =
d and codim(Γ(I, d)) = 2d, otherwise, dim(Γ(I, d)) = codim(Γ(I, d)) = 1.
Proof. Let X ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, E = {n + 1, . . . , n + 2d} and Y ⊂ E. Let Γ be
the game given in Example 1 taking E as the set of players. Observe that if∑
i∈X ai > b,
∑
i∈X ai ≥ b + 1, thus X ∪ Y is a winning coalition in Γ(I, d).
When
∑
i∈X ai < b,
∑
i∈X ai ≤ b − 1, thus X ∪ Y is a losing coalition in
Γ(I, d). In the case that
∑
i∈X ai = b, X ∪Y is a winning coalition in Γ(I, d)
iff Y is a winning coalition in Γ.
When I is a yes instance of SSP it follows that dim(Γ(I, d)) = d as
otherwise Γ will have a smaller dimension. On the other hand, it is easy to
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see that Γ(I, d)∗ is the composition of d+ 1 unanimity games and therefore
dim(Γ(I, d)∗) = 2d according to [5], thus codim(Γ(I, d)) = 2d. When I is a
no instance, there is no X ⊆ {1, . . . , n} for which ∑i∈X ai = b. Therefore
X∪Y is winning in Γ(I, d) iff ∑i∈X ai ≥ b+1. Thus Γ(I, d) is the game [b+
1; a1, . . . , an, 0, 2d. . ., 0] and we conclude that dim(Γ(I, d)) = codim(Γ(I, d)) =
1.
Combining lemmas 3 and 2 we can prove the following results.
Proposition 2. Let d1 and d2 be two integers with 1 ≤ d2 < d1. Then
the problem of deciding whether the union of d1 given WMGs can also be
represented as the union of d2 WMGs is NP-hard.
Proposition 3. Let d1 and d2 be two integers with 1 ≤ d1, d2. Then the
problem of deciding whether the intersection (union) of d1 given WMGs can
also be represented as the union (intersection) of d2 WMGs is NP-hard.
As a consequence of the previous results, given a simple game Γ as union
or intersection of WMGs, to compute dim(Γ), codim(Γ) or deciding whether
Γ is weighted are NP-hard problems.
Recall that two game representations are said to be equivalent whenever
the represented games have the same set of winning coalitions. We can
extend several results on equivalence problems from [2] to games given as
unions of WMG, in particular we have.
Proposition 4. Checking whether a given union of WMGs is equivalent to
a given union of WMGs is co-NP-complete, even if all weights are equal to
0 or 1.
3 Future work
It remains open to exhaustively classify the dimension and codimension of
all complete simple game up to n players. Some bounds about dimension
are given by Freixas and Puente [5] and Olsen et al. [11]. As well as to
find complete simple games with small dimension (codimension), but with
large codimension (dimension), and to construct analytical examples with
specific dimension and codimension. It is also interesting to find real simple
games with large dimension or codimension as the example given by Kurz
and Napel [8].
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